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Abstract This paper presents a risk-based approach to re-
silient network design. The basic design problem considered
is that given a working network and a fixed budget, how best
to allocate the budget for deploying a survivability technique
in different parts of the network based on managing the risk.
The term risk measures two related quantities: the likelihood
of failure or attack, and the amount of damage caused by the
failure or attack. Various designs with different risk-based
design objectives are considered, for example, minimizing
the expected damage, minimizing the maximum damage,
and minimizing a measure of the variability of damage that
could occur in the network. A design methodology for the
proposed risk-based survivable network design approach is
presented within an optimization model framework. Numer-
ical results and analysis illustrating the different risk based
designs and the tradeoffs among the schemes are presented.
Keywords Risk · Survivable networks · Fault tolerance ·
Incremental design
1 Introduction
Communication networks are one of the critical infrastruc-
tures upon which society depends [1, 2]. Recognition of this
has led to a body of work on designing survivable networks
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with a focus on wired backbone networks [3–6]. The ba-
sic approach for survivable network design is for a given
network technology (e.g., WDM) and a given survivabil-
ity technique (e.g., link protection, path protection, shared
backup path protection, p-cycles etc.), a network is designed
to survive a set of predefined failures, (e.g., all single link
failures), with minimum cost [3–6]. This basic design ap-
proach involves determining an allocation of spare capacity
in the network and an assignment of backup routes to mini-
mize the cost.
However, a limitation of this minimum-cost design ap-
proach is that it treats all failures equally without consider-
ing the variability in failure impacts and likelihood of fail-
ures. Several, recent studies have noted that failure rates
and repair rates are geographically correlated [1, 7, 8] due
to a number of factors. Examples of factors are variations
in: weather, workforce capabilities, exposure to natural dis-
asters (e.g., earthquakes, hurricanes, ice storms, etc.), lo-
cal regulations (e.g., call before dig penalties), and power
supply reliability. An additional major drawback of the
minimum-cost design approach is the hidden assumption
that sufficient monetary funds are available to protect all the
predefined failure scenarios. In practice, many network op-
erators have a very limited budget for improving network
survivability, (e.g., a quarterly capital expenditure budget).
This is especially true in access networks and edge service
providers (e.g., Tier 3 ISPs). Often operators have to build
out the survivable network in pieces in an incremental man-
ner based on a chronological sequence of budgets. Even in
a situation that the network operators have sufficient mone-
tary funds to protect the networks against any set of failures,
they may prefer to reduce their capital expenditures in net-
work survivability by choosing to protect only some parts of
the networks based on a cost-benefit analysis. This situation
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cannot directly be addressed in the minimum-cost design ap-
proach.
Here, we propose a different approach based on the adop-
tion of risk management techniques. Risk management has
been advocated for critical infrastructure protection as the
method of choice in allocating scarce/spare resources for
guarding against failure, accidents and attacks [2, 9, 10].
Risk analysis is widely used in aerospace and civil engi-
neering, IT security and economics [1, 11, 12]. In engineer-
ing fields, the term risk accounts not only for a probability
of failure but also for a degree of damage resulting from
the failure. The risk of a failure is commonly defined as the
product of the failure probability and the magnitude of dam-
age caused by the failure [11]. In communication networks,
potential failures, such as fiber cuts and equipment failures
(e.g., router, cross connect, etc.) cause a risk to the network.
Typically, different parts of the network are associated with
different risk levels. For example, the rate of cable cuts per
km of cable in the United States shows a large variation
based on the geographic location and population density. In
addition, failures in some parts of the network could result
in a higher magnitude of damage than the others. For exam-
ple, failure of an optical fiber carrying critical supervisory
control and data acquisition (SCADA) traffic for the elec-
trical power grid can result in more societal damage than a
fiber carrying web data traffic. Also, the cost for deploying
a survivability technique varies across different parts of the
network. For example, some network links may have longer
backup paths than others, based on the network topology
(and the routing policy of backup paths) and thus require a
higher spare capacity cost.
Observing that the risk level and the survivability cost
vary across the network infrastructure, therefore in the case
where network operators have a fixed budget for improv-
ing network survivability, they need to have careful plan-
ning to determine the best budget allocation for deploying
network survivability in different parts of the network based
on managing the risk (i.e., failure impacts and likelihood
of failures). This is the design problem we consider in the
risk based resilient network design approach proposed here.
Note, that different risk metrics can be used in the resilient
network design problem. The typical metric is to minimize
the average network risk. However, in many fields (e.g., fi-
nance, civil engineering, etc.) one often considers different
risk based metrics such as the maximum risk or maximum
damage that occurs for the failure scenarios considered or a
metric that considers both the mean risk and its variability.
Here, we formulate four risk management resilient network
design techniques using link protection or path protection to
provide survivability. The first approach minimizes the aver-
age network risk. The second formulation is a linear combi-
nation of the mean network risk and the maximum damage
from the worst case failure scenario. The third model min-
imizes a linear combination of the mean network risk and
the maximum risk case. Lastly, we consider minimizing the
variability of risk across all failure scenarios using a mini-
mum root mean squared damage metric. Additionally, solu-
tion methods for the optimization formulations, along with
numerical results and analysis illustrating the different risk
based designs and the tradeoffs among them are presented.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Sec-
tion 2 introduces the risk approach for resilient network de-
sign. The proposed risk management based resilient network
design techniques are presented in Sect. 3. Section 4 reports
numerical results and a comparative evaluation of the dif-
ferent risk management survivable network designs. Lastly,
Sect. 5 summarizes our conclusions.
2 A risk based approach
The risk-based design approach proposed here integrates
risk analysis techniques into an incremental network design
procedure with budget constraints. In engineering fields, the
term risk measures two quantities related to failures: the
likelihood of failure and the amount of damage resulting
from the failure. The risk of a failure is commonly defined as
the product of the failure probability and the magnitude of
damage caused by the failure [11]. In communication net-
works, potential failures, such as fiber cuts and equipment
failures (e.g., router, line card, etc.) cause a risk to the net-
work. As noted above, different geographic parts of the net-
work have different risk levels. Furthermore, network fail-
ures result in different levels of damage depending on the
type of traffic carried. These factors can be incorporated into
a risk metric as discussed below.
Risk assessment is a process of quantifying the amount of
risk associated with failures in the network. The risk of fail-
ure is defined as the probability of failure times the damage
from failure [11]; this is the traditional definition in engi-
neering and IT security. In a network with n failure-prone
components, each of which could be in either a failure state
or a non-failure state, there are a total of 2n possible network
states (i.e., failure scenarios). Each network state uniquely
identifies a set of failed components and working compo-
nents in that state. Let S denote the set of network failure
states, or failure scenarios, indexed by s. The risk associ-
ated with network state s, denoted by risks , is equal to the
product of the probability of the network being in state s,
denoted by stateprobs , and the amount of damage occurring
in network state s, denoted by damages , as shown in (1).
risks = stateprobs × damages (1)
By definition all network states are mutually exclusive to
each other. Thus the network risk, denoted by Netrisk, can
be calculated by summing the risk associated with each net-
work state over all states, as in (2). In fact, the total network
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risk in (2) can be interpreted as the mean or expected dam-
age level across all network states.
Netrisk =
∑
s∈S
stateprobs × damages (2)
For each network state, the state probability can be calcu-
lated by multiplying together the appropriate failure prob-
ability (i.e., unavailability) and availability of all network
components. If link failures (e.g., cable cuts in optical net-
works) are considered as the only source of failures in the
network and the failures are statistically independent of each
other, the probability of network state s can be obtained as
in (3). Note that L denotes a set of links; states,i represents
the network failure states, where states,i = 1 if link i fails in
network state s, and states,i = 0 otherwise; and ui denotes
the unavailability of cable i.
stateprobs =
∏
i∈L
u
states,i
i (1 − ui)1−states,i (3)
The amount of damage that occurs in each network state
or failure scenario can be measured in different ways. How-
ever, in connection-oriented networks, such as WDM, and
MPLS, it is natural to consider the amount of damage as-
sociated with the loss of each end-to-end connection (e.g.,
lightpaths in WDM, LSPs in MPLS) due to network fail-
ures. Hence, the amount of damage that occurs in network
state s is the sum of damages of all failed connections in
network state s, as shown in (4), where damr is the amount
of damage caused by a failure of connection r .
Netrisk =
∑
s∈S
stateprobs
( ∑
all failed connections r
in network state s
damr
)
(4)
Note that if information on the traffic is available, one can
construct a damage metric associated with each end-to-end
connection that incorporates the societal or monetary effects
of the loss. Here the amount of damage caused by a failure
of connection r is equal to the data rate of connection r itself
(i.e., damr = mr).
Once the risk has been identified and assessed, the next
component in the design approach is a risk management in-
vestment strategy. The task of a risk management investment
strategy is to determine how to allocate a fixed budget for de-
ploying resources in the network in order to reduce or man-
age the network risk. These techniques can be categorized
as prevention, and survivability techniques.
Prevention techniques seek to reduce the failure proba-
bility or increase the reliability of network components. In
communications networks, this can be achieved by using
more reliable network equipment, backup power supplies,
etc. However, improving network components’ reliability is
sometimes technically infeasible. Even if the most reliable
network components are deployed, the desired level of net-
work risk may still not be achieved. Therefore, survivability
techniques are also employed. Survivability techniques per-
form a corrective action upon failure. In other words, these
techniques aim at reducing the amount of damage resulting
from a failure, rather than reducing the failure probability of
network components as do the prevention techniques.
Various techniques for reducing the risk of failures in
communication networks exist (e.g., p-cycles, 1 + 1 pro-
tection, etc). In this paper, we study both link protection
and path protection schemes [3, 5, 6]. In link protection, a
backup path that reconnects the end points of the protected
link is determined with appropriate spare capacity allocated
to the backup path in order to recover all the working capac-
ity on the protected link.
In path protection, one sets up an end-to-end backup path
with appropriate spare capacity for a protected connection
(e.g., LSP in MPLS, end to end lightpath in WDM). In the
link protection case, the task of risk management design is
to determine which network links to protect and their corre-
sponding backup routes for a given budget to achieve a risk-
based objective. Whereas in path protection, the risk based
design is used to determine which end-to-end connections to
protect and their corresponding backup routes based on the
risk criteria subject to a budget constraint.
Different design objectives can be considered in the risk
based design approach. For example the basic design objec-
tive is to minimize the network risk as in (4). Alternative
design objectives include minimizing the maximum damage
that could occur in the network from any failure scenario,
minimizing the maximum risk that could occur in the net-
work for any failure scenario or minimizing the variability
of damage across network states as determined by the root
mean square (RMS) of the damage.
Figure 1 illustrates the overall design process along with
inputs and outputs of the risk-based design. First, the work-
ing network, which includes a network topology, and work-
ing routes of all end-to-end connections, is given to the risk-
based survivable network design problem. The given work-
ing network may have been designed based on any design
objective, such as minimizing the cost, minimizing the de-
lay or hop counts, maximizing network utilization [3], etc.
A survivability cost model and a fixed budget are also
given to the risk based design problem. In the design proce-
dure used here, an assumption is that the survivability cost is
considered only in term of a spare capacity, and a unit cost of
spare capacity on any link is a function of cable length (i.e.,
a unit of spare capacity on a longer cable is more expensive
than a unit of spare capacity on a shorter cable). Also, the
budget is considered only in term of the maximum spare ca-
pacity investment. The spare capacity can only be invested
on the existing network links; adding new links to the cur-
rent network topology in order to support backup paths is
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Fig. 1 Risk based Resilient Network Design Procedure
not (included in the current formulation) permissible in this
study but it is relatively straightforward to extend the formu-
lation to study this case.
Note that the design approach can be applied in a sequen-
tial fashion to improve the network resilience based on a se-
quence of budgets as detailed in [13]. The notation adopted
in the paper is summarized in Table 1 for the link protection
case, with additional variables for the path protection case
given in the text.
3 Resilient network design based on risk
In this section we present the risk based design model for-
mulations. We start with the basic minimum risk survivable
network design which aims at minimizing the total network
risk, or equivalently the expected damage across all network
states. This is followed by the other risk based design objec-
tive formulations, presented as extensions to the minimum
risk design.
3.1 Minimum risk survivable network design
The minimum risk survivable network design can be formu-
lated as an Integer Programming (InP) optimization problem
for both the link protection and path protection cases. The
formulation is based on a link-path model (also known as
an arc-flow model [3, 13, 14]), which requires a set of pre-
computed routes as candidate backup routes for each backup
path. The InP formulation for the minimum risk link protec-
tion design is presented as Problem (P1) below.
The decision variables are the binary variables bpi , which
determine a set of network links to be protected, where
bpi = 1 if link i is protected and bpi = 0 otherwise, and
the binary variables f qi which determine the backup routes
for protected links where f qi = 1 if link i is protected and
uses the qth route in the backup route set Qi for its backup
path, and f qi = 0 otherwise. The design objective in (5) is to
minimize the total network risk. Constraint set (6) indicates
that if link i is protected, there must exist one backup path,
for which the route is selected from a set of eligible backup
routes Qi . Constraints (7)–(10) are the failure state relation-
ships, which determine whether or not end-to-end connec-
tion r fails in network state s, taking into account the link
protection to be deployed in the network. More specifically,
constraint set (7) determines whether or not the backup path
for link i is available in network state s. The backup path for
link i might not be available in network state s (i.e., hs,i = 1)
for two reasons: either the backup path exists but fails due to
a link failure in that network state (i.e., ∑q∈Qi f
q
i ζ
q
s,i = 1),
or link i is not protected (i.e., 1-bpi = 1). Constraint set (8)
indicates that link i fails in network state s (i.e., es,i = 1)
if and only if both the working link fails (i.e., states,i = 1)
and its backup path is not available (i.e., hs,i = 1) in that
network state. Constraint set (9) indicates that connection r
fails in network state s (ys,r > 0) if and only if at least one
of the links that it traverses fails (i.e., ∑i∈L es,ipr,i > 0).
Constraint set (10) connects variable ys,r to binary variable
zs,r so that zs,r = 1 if ys,r > 0, and zs,r = 0 otherwise. Con-
straint set (11) calculates the amount of damage for each net-
work state as the sum of damages associated with all failed
connections in that network state. Constraint set (12) calcu-
lates the total network risk as the sum of the product of the
state damage and the state probability for all network states.
Constraint (13) is the budget constraint which limits the total
spare capacity investment, where cj is the unit cost of spare
capacity on link j,wi is the amount of working capacity on
link i, and parameter δqi,j = 1 if the qth eligible backup route
for link i in the set Qi includes link j , and δqi,j = 0 other-
wise. Lastly, constraint sets (14) and (15) express the binary
nature of the design and failure variables.
Problem (P1) Minimum risk link protection design problem
min
bpi ,f
q
i
Netrisk (5)
∑
q∈Qi
f
q
i = bpi, ∀i ∈ L (6)
hs,i =
∑
q∈Qi
f
q
i ζ
q
s,i + 1 − bpi, s ∈ S, i ∈ L (7)
es,i = states,ihs,i , s ∈ S, i ∈ L (8)
ys,r =
∑
i∈L
es,ipr,i , s ∈ S, r ∈ R (9)
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Table 1 Notation
N , L, R, S Set of nodes, links or cables, lightpaths, and
network states
P = {pr,i}|R|×|L| pr,i = 1 if lightpath r uses link i in its working path, and = 0 otherwise
m = {mr }|R| mr is the data rate (bits/s) of lightpath r
ui Unavailability of cable i
wi Amount of working capacity on link i,
calculated by wi = ∑r∈R pr,imr
bn,i bn,i = 1 if node n is the origin or destination
of link i, and = 0 otherwise
dr,n dr,n = 1 if node n is the source or destination
of lightpath r , and = 0 otherwise
STATE = {states,i}|S|×|L| states,i = 1 if cable i is cut in network state s, and = 0 otherwise
stateprob = {stateprobs}|S| stateprobs is the probability of network state s
damr Damage caused by a failure of lightpath r
damages Damage occurring in network state s
ci The unit cost of spare capacity on link i
budget The budget
K A large constant used for bounding
risks Amount of risk associated with network state s
Netrisk Total risk to the network
gs,r gs,r > 0 if a working path for lightpath r fails in network state s, and = 0
otherwise
ys,r ys,r > 0 if lightpath r fails in network state s, and = 0 otherwise
zs,r zs,r = 1 if lightpath r fails in network state s, and = 0 otherwise
1M×N An M × N matrix with only elements “1”
TI Time Interval over which risk/damage
assessed (e.g. 31,536,000 sec/year)
bp = {bpi}|L| bpi = 1 if link i is protected, and = 0
otherwise
Q = {qi,j }|L|×|L| qi,j = 1 if link i is protected and its backup
path traverses link j , and = 0 otherwise
hs,i hs,i > 0 if a backup path for link i is not
available (either link i is not protected, or the backup path fails) in network
state s, and = 0 otherwise
es,i es,i > 0 if link i fails (both working link fails
and backup path is not available) in network state s, and = 0 otherwise
Qi Set of eligible backup routes for link i
δ
q
i,j δ
q
i,j = 1 if the qth eligible backup route for
link i in the set Qi includes link j , and = 0 otherwise
ζ
q
s,i ζ
q
s,i = 1 if the qth backup route for link i in
the set Qi fails in network state s, and = 0 otherwise
f
q
i f
q
i = 1 if link i is protected and uses the qth
route in the backup route set Qi for its backup path, and = 0 otherwise
zs,rK ≥ ys,r , s ∈ S, r ∈ R (10)
damages =
∑
r∈R
zs,rdamr , ∀s ∈ S (11)
Netrisk =
∑
s∈S
stateprobs × damages (12)
∑
i∈L
∑
q∈Qi
∑
j∈L
cjwif
q
i δ
q
i,j ≤ budget (13)
bpi, f
q
i : binary, ∀i ∈ L, ∀q ∈ Qi (14)
zs,r : binary, ∀s ∈ S, ∀r ∈ R (15)
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For the path protection case, the minimum-risk surviv-
able network design formulation (P2) is presented in (16)–
(25). The set of decision variables are binary variables bpr ,
which determine a set of end-to-end connections to be pro-
tected, where bpr = 1 if connection r is protected and
bpr = 0 otherwise, and the binary variables f qr , which de-
termine the backup routes for protected connections, where
f
q
r = 1 if connection r is protected and uses the qth route
in the backup route set Qr for its backup path, and = 0
otherwise. The objective (16) is to minimize the total net-
work risk. Constraint set (17) indicates that if connection r
is protected, there must exist one backup path, whose route
is selected from a set of eligible backup routes Qr . Con-
straints (18)–(20) are the failure state relationships which
determine whether or not connection r will fail in network
state s, taking into account path protection to be deployed
in the network. More specifically, constraint set (18) deter-
mines whether or not the backup path for connection r is
available in network state s. The backup path for connection
r might not be available in network state s (i.e., hs,r = 1) for
two reasons: either the backup path exists but fails due to a
link failure in that network state (i.e., ∑q∈Qr f
q
r ζ
q
s,r = 1), or
connection r is not protected (i.e., bpr = 0, or 1-bpr = 1).
Constraint set (19) indicates that end-to-end connection r
fails in network state s (i.e., ys,r > 0) if and only if both its
working path fails (i.e., gs,r > 0) and its backup path is not
available in that network state (i.e., hs,r = 1). Constraint set
(20) relates variable ys,r to binary variable zs,r (i.e., zs,r = 1
if ys,r > 0, and zs,r = 0 otherwise). Constraints (21)–(22)
are for the calculation of the risk as in (4). Constraint (23)
is the budget constraint which limits the total capacity in-
vestment on the end-to-end backup paths. Lastly, constraints
(24) and (25) express the binary nature of the design and
failure variables.
Problem (P2) Minimum risk path protection design problem
min
bpr ,f
q
r
Netrisk (16)
∑
q∈Qr
f
q
r = bpr, ∀r ∈ R (17)
hs,r =
∑
q∈Qr
f
q
r ζ
q
s,r + 1 − bpr, s ∈ S, r ∈ R (18)
ys,r = gs,rhs,r , s ∈ S, r ∈ R (19)
zs,rK ≥ ys,r , s ∈ S, r ∈ R (20)
damages =
∑
r∈R
zs,rdr , ∀s ∈ S (21)
Netrisk =
∑
s∈S
stateprobs × damages (22)
∑
r∈R
∑
q∈Qr
∑
j∈L
cjmrf
q
r δ
q
r,j ≤ budget (23)
bpr, f
q
r : binary, ∀r ∈ R, ∀q ∈ Qr (24)
zs,r : binary, ∀s ∈ S, ∀r ∈ R (25)
The optimization Problems (P1) and (P2) are binary in-
teger programming problems and can be solved by standard
techniques such as the branch and bound method. Note that
the minimum-risk survivable network design aims at mini-
mizing the total network risk, or equivalently the expected
damage across all network states. This design objective fo-
cuses only on the mean aspect of the relationship between
the damage level and the failure likelihood, while ignoring
other aspects of the probabilistic distribution, such as the
variability of damage and failure probabilities across the net-
work states, and the amount of damage that could occur in
the network in the worst-case failure scenario. In the follow-
ing subsections, alternative risk-based survivable network
designs which consider different aspects of the probabilistic
distribution of damage, other than the expected value, are
considered.
3.2 Minimum-maximum damage survivable network
design
One approach is to minimize the maximum amount of dam-
age that could occur in the network in addition to the ex-
pected damage. This results in the objective of the design
being to minimize: k1 × Netrisk + k2 × maxdamage, where
Netrisk denotes the total network risk; maxdamage denotes
the maximum amount of damage that could occur in the net-
work in any failure scenario; and k1 and k2 are design pa-
rameters. By varying the values of k1 and k2, different sur-
vivable network designs are obtained. In the extreme cases,
when k1 = 0, the design is aimed at minimizing the maxi-
mum damage only, whereas if k2 = 0, the design minimizes
the total network risk. The minimum-maximum damage sur-
vivable network design can be formulated as an Integer Pro-
gramming (InP) optimization Problem (P3) similar to Prob-
lem (P1) above with the modifications given below. The de-
sign objective (26) in (P3) is to minimize a linear summa-
tion of the total network risk and the maximum damage that
could occur in any network state. The constraint sets (6)–
(11) are taken from (P1) and serve the same purpose here.
Constraint set (27) determines the maximum damage that
could occur in the network. Lastly constraints (12)–(15) are
taken from Problem (P1) to express the budgetary limits and
the binary nature of the design variables.
Problem (P3) Min-max damage link protection design prob-
lem
min
bpi ,f
q
i
k1 × Netrisk + k2 × maxdamage (26)
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Constraints (6)–(11) from (P1)
maxdamage ≥ damages , ∀s ∈ S (27)
Constraints (12)–(15) from (P1)
The minimum maximum damage path protection design
problem can be formulated following Problem (P2) and (P3)
above with the result given below as Problem (P4). The de-
sign objective (28) in (P4) is to minimize a linear summa-
tion of the total network risk and the maximum damage that
could occur in any network state. The constraint sets (17)–
(21) are taken from (P2) and serve the same functional rela-
tionship here. Constraint set (29) determines the maximum
damage that could occur in the network. Constraints (22)–
(25) are taken from Problem (P2) to express the total net-
work risk, the budget constraints and the binary nature of
the design and failure variables.
Problem (P4) Min-max damage path protection design prob-
lem
min
bpr ,f
q
r
k1 × Netrisk + k2 × maxdamage (28)
Constraints (17)–(21) from (P2)
maxdamage ≥ damages , ∀s ∈ S (29)
Constraints (22)–(25) from (P2)
As in the minimum risk design case, problems (P3) and
(P4) are binary integer programming problems and can be
solved using the branch and bound algorithm.
3.3 Minimum-maximum risk survivable network design
The min-max damage survivable network design presented
above considers the maximum amount of damage that could
occur in the network, while ignoring the occurrence prob-
ability of that failure. Therefore, the network might be de-
signed to protect against failure scenarios that have a high
damage level, but are unlikely to occur (e.g., multiple-link
failures). An alternative to this is to minimize the maximum
risk that could occur in any network state, where the risk
associated with each network state is defined as the prod-
uct of the amount of damage in that network state and the
state probability. Thus the design objective is to minimize
the function: k1 × Netrisk + k2 × maxrisk, which is a lin-
ear summation of the total risk, and the maximum risk that
could occur in any network state, denoted by maxrisk. The
terms k1 and k2 are design parameters. By varying the val-
ues of k1 and k2, different survivable network designs can
be obtained. In the extreme cases, when k1 = 0, the design is
aimed at minimizing the maximum risk only, whereas when
k2 = 0, the design is aimed at minimizing the total risk. This
can be formulated as an InP Problem (P5) which is similar
to (P1) above which some modifications as given below. The
design objective (30) in (P5) is to minimize a linear sum-
mation of the total risk and the maximum risk that could
occur in any network state. The constraint sets (6)–(11) are
taken from (P1) and serve the same purpose here. Constraint
sets (31)–(33) are particular to this problem and calculate the
maximum risk that could occur in any network state. Lastly
constraints (13)–(15) are take form Problem (P1) to express
the budget limitations and the binary nature of the design
variables.
Problem (P5) Min-max risk link protection design problem
min
bpi ,f
q
i
k1 × Netrisk + k2 × maxrisk (30)
Constraints (6)–(11) from (P1)
risks = damagesstateprobs , ∀s ∈ S (31)
maxrisk ≥ risks , ∀s ∈ S (32)
Netrisk =
∑
s∈S
risks (33)
Constraints (13)–(15) from (P1)
In a like fashion, the minimum maximum risk path pro-
tection design problem can be formulated following Prob-
lem (P2) and (P5) above with the result given below as prob-
lem (P6). The objective function (34) is the weight sum of
the network risk and the maximum risk. The constraint sets
(17)–(21) are taken from (P2) and serve the same function
here. Constraint sets (35)–(37) are specific to this problem
and determine the maximum risk that could occur in any
network state. Constraints (22)–(25) are take from Problem
(P2) to determine the total network risk, the limit on the bud-
get and the binary nature of the design and failure variables.
Problem (P6) Min-max risk path protection design problem
min
bpr ,f
q
r
k1 × Netrisk + k2 × maxrisk (34)
Constraints (17)–(21) from (P2)
risks = damagesstateprobs , ∀s ∈ S (35)
maxrisk ≥ risks , ∀s ∈ S (36)
Netrisk =
∑
s∈S
risks (37)
Constraints (22)–(25) from (P2). Similar to problems
(P1)–(P4), problems (P5) and (P6) are binary integer pro-
gramming problems and can be solved using the branch and
bound algorithm.
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3.4 Minimum-RMS damage survivable network design
In contrast to the risk based designs above, the objective of
the minimum Root Mean Squared (RMS) damage design
is to minimize the variability of damage across all failure
scenarios. The variability of the damage is measured by the
square root of the expected damage-squared value across all
network states as calculated in (38). By squaring the damage
value of each network state, the values in the network states
with higher damage levels are increased to a greater extent
than the values in the network states with lower damage lev-
els. Hence, this objective function encourages the design to
protect against failures with higher damage levels as com-
pared to the minimum risk design.
RMS of damage =
√∑
s∈S
stateprobs × damage2s (38)
The amount of damage in each network state is a func-
tion of design variables (i.e., which links/end-to-end connec-
tions to protect, and the routes of all backup paths), therefore
the RMS of the damage is non-linear. Since the objective
function of the minimum RMS damage design is non-linear,
the design problem cannot be solved using a straightfor-
ward InP approach. Here, a simple iterative greedy heuris-
tic algorithm is proposed for solving the design problem for
both link and path protection. A flow chart of the heuris-
tic is shown in Fig. 2. Given a working network topology,
a pre-computed set of possible backup routes and a fixed
budget, the algorithm finds a feasible initial solution as fol-
lows. First the cost of each possible backup route is com-
puted. Then for each link/end-to-end lightpath with backup
routes whose cost is less than the budget, the amount of
reduction in the RMS-damage of using a backup path to
protect the link/lightpath is computed. The link whose ra-
tio of RMS-damage reduction/backup path cost is largest is
selected for implementing link protection. The process re-
peats until no more links can be protected due to the budget
limit, or all the links have been protected. Since the result
from the initial solution might not be an optimal, an iterative
process is used to improve the solution. The iterative step
is based on the idea that it may be possible to improve the
current solution by randomly removing the protection from
a protected link/lightpath in the current solution, followed
by updating the budget, and then choosing to protect other
unprotected links/lightpaths using one of the pre-computed
backup routes that could produce a greater reduction in RMS
of damage. The iterative process keeps reducing the amount
of RMS of damage, and terminates when the current solu-
tion cannot be improved further, or a predefined number of
iterations is reached.
Fig. 2 Flowchart of greedy heuristic for Minimum RMS damage de-
sign
4 Numerical results
This section presents numerical results and analysis of the
proposed risk based resilient network designs. The numer-
ical experiments were carried out in the context of an Op-
tical Transport Network (OTN). An OTN consists of Opti-
cal Cross Connects (OXCs) interconnected by WDM optical
fiber links organized in a mesh topology. An end-to-end con-
nection between a source and a destination OXC is called a
lightpath. A lightpath occupies a wavelength on each opti-
cal fiber link that it traverses. Figure 3 shows the network
topology used in the experiments. The cable lengths in kilo-
meters are given next to each link in the figure, along with
the Cable Cut (CC) metric in parentheses. The CC is the
average cable length in kilometers that results in a single
cable cut per year and is used to determine the unavailabil-
ity of the links as in [3, 16]. All the cables have the same
Mean Time To Repair (MTTR) of 24 hours. A full mesh of
lightpath demands between all node pairs is assumed, each
of which carries the same data rate of 10 Gbps. The work-
ing path of each lightpath is routed along the shortest path
based on the hop count, and given to the design problem.
Also, the spare capacity cost is defined as 1 budget unit per
10 Gbps/1000 km. In addition, it is assumed that each OXC
has full wavelength conversion capability, so that the wave-
length continuity constraint can be ignored.
Risk based resilient network design
In the risk calculation, the damage is measured as the
traffic loss rate resulting from failed lightpaths. Also, we
consider only the network states with at most two simul-
taneous failures, rather than all possible states. This signifi-
cantly reduces the number of states considered from 2|L| to
1 + |L|(|L| + 1)/2, but still gives a close approximation of
the overall risk, since most of the probability mass is in the
network states with a small number of simultaneous failures.
[11, 15, 16].
In the experiments, the minimum risk, minimum-
maximum damage and minimum-maximum risk design
InP models of Sect. 3 were solved using the commercial
CPLEX/AMPL solver with all possible routes within two
hops from the shortest backup route used as a set of pre-
computed possible backup routes. Whereas the minimum-
RMS damage design problems were solved using the heuris-
tic algorithm explained in Sect. 3 with the same set of pre-
computed backup routes used in the InP models. Numerical
results are shown only for a few budget values with addi-
tional results given in [13, 14].
For the min-max damage design, the design parameters:
k1 = 1 and k2 = 1, are used; whereas for the min-max risk
Fig. 3 Network (|N | = 10, |L| = 22) with cable length (km) and Ca-
ble Cut (CC) metric within parentheses
design, the parameters: k1 = 1 and k2 = 100, are used.
These parameter values are chosen such that the min-max
damage design puts a higher priority on minimizing the
maximum damage than minimizing the total network risk;
and the min-max risk design puts a higher priority on mini-
mizing the maximum risk than minimizing the total network
risk.
Comparisons are made based on the following measures:
the probability of no damage which is the probability that
the network is in states that have a zero-damage level taking
into account the protection deployed in the network, the total
network risk, the maximum damage, the maximum risk, the
RMS of damage, the standard deviation of damage and lastly
the probability distribution of damage.
Table 2 shows typical results for each design scheme us-
ing link protection. Table 2 is for the case of maximum bud-
get of 30 units which is approximately 50% of the min-
imum cost required to protect every link in the network.
From the table, one can see that the min-max risk design has
the largest probability of no damage. However, the differ-
ence with the other schemes is small <1.25%). As expected
the minimum-risk design has the smallest total risk level.
Whereas, the min-max risk design and the minimum-RMS
damage design have comparable total risk levels. The min-
max damage design, results in the highest total risk level,
much larger than the other designs. This is understandable
because the min-max damage design does not take the prob-
ability of failure into a consideration. Therefore, the design
might protect the network against failure scenarios which
have high damage levels but a small probability of occur-
ring, which results in a small risk reduction. In terms of the
maximum damage that could occur in the network from any
network state, the results show that the min-max damage
design provides the lowest maximum damage level, with all
other designs resulting in similar maximum damage levels.
Comparing the different designs in term of the maximum
risk that could occur, the results show that the min-max risk
design provides the lowest maximum risk level. Notice that
both the minimum risk design and the min-max damage de-
sign results in the highest maximum risk level. Lastly, we
Table 2 Comparison of different risk-based link protection designs for a budget of 30 units
Metric Design’s objective function
Min risk Min-max damage Min-max risk Min RMS damage
Probability of no damage 0.9819 (+1.22%) 0.9765 (+.66%) 0.9701 (0%) 0.9762 (+.63%)
Total network risk (Mbps) 549.53 (0%) 706.63 (+28.59%) 649.58 (+18.21%) 589.58 (+7.29%)
Maximum damage (Gbps) 90 (+12.5%) 80 (0%) 90 (+12.5%) 90 (+12.5%)
Maximum risk (Mbps) 96.26 (+19.96%) 96.26 (+19.96%) 80.24 (0%) 81.25 (+1.25%)
RMS damage (Mbps) 4,312.29 (+2.85%) 4,814.95 (+14.84%) 4,264.56 (+1.71%) 4,192.67 (0%)
Std. of damage (Mbps) 4,242.32 (+3.22%) 4,711.34 (+14.63%) 4,165.94 (+1.36%) 4,109.92 (0%)
Expected + Std. of damage 4,791.84 (+1.96%) 5,417.97 (+15.29%) 4,815.53 (+2.47%) 4,699.50 (0%)
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compare the different risk-based designs in terms of the vari-
ability of damage that could occur in the network. Two mea-
sures of the variability of damage are presented here: the
RMS of damage and the one-side standard deviation (Std.)
of damage. The one-side standard deviation of damage is
defined as:
√ ∑
s∈S:damages>expected damage value
stateprobs(damages − expected damage value)2
where only the network states with the damage level greater
than the expected damage value are included in the cal-
culation. The Table 2 results show that, among the risk-
based designs considered, the minimum-RMS damage de-
sign yields the lowest RMS value and the smallest one-side
Std. of damage. The min-max risk design yields a lower
RMS value of damage, and lower Std. of damage than the
minimum- network risk design. Notice that the min-max risk
design has variability metrics that are close to minimum-
RMS. Whereas, the min-max damage design results in the
highest values for both RMS of damage and Std. of dam-
age.
We also compare the different risk-based designs in term
of a linear summation of the expected damage value (i.e.,
the total risk) and the one-side Std. of damage. This measure
takes into account both the expected value and the variability
of damage above the expected value. This is a common ap-
proach for comparing different investments in the financial
industry (i.e., expected value and variance of the portfolio’s
return). Based on this measure, we can say that one design
is preferred to another design when it has a lower expected
damage value and a lower Std. of damage than the other de-
sign; otherwise, a tradeoff between the minimization of the
expected damage and the minimization of the variability of
damage must be considered. This tradeoff can be achieved
through assigning the weight to each quantity indicating its
relative importance according to the preference toward the
expected value or the Std. of damage (i.e., risk-averse or
risk-seeking). Here, we assume that the weights for both the
expected damage and the variation of damage are equal to
one. The results in Table 2 show that the minimum-RMS
damage design has the smallest value.
The probability distribution of damage in the network
is shown in Fig. 4. The probability distribution of damage
with no protection deployed is shown in Fig. 4(a). In ad-
dition, the four different risk-based designs for a budget of
30 units are presented in Fig. 4(b)–(e). These damage dis-
tribution plots in Fig. 4 show how the different risk-based
designs reduce the failure probability associated with each
damage levels from the initial values in Fig. 4(a). The re-
sults show the advantage of the minimum-RMS damage de-
sign (Fig. 4(e)) over other design alternatives in that it re-
sults in lower probabilities for the higher damage levels. The
minimum-RMS damage design, which aims at minimizing
the variability of damage above zero damage, protects the
network in a way that the network tends to have lower like-
lihood of high damage levels, at the expense of higher prob-
abilities for the smaller damage levels, as compared to other
design approaches. For example, the minimum-RMS dam-
age design results in higher or comparable probabilities for
the low damage levels (i.e., traffic loss rate of 10, 20, and
30 Gbps) than the minimum-risk design, but smaller or com-
parable probabilities for the larger damage levels (i.e., traffic
loss rate of 40 Gbps and above).
Table 3 shows representative results for each design
scheme using path protection. Table 3 is for the case of
maximum budget of 30 units, which is about 75% of the
minimum cost required for protecting all the lightpaths in
the network. Note that as discussed in the literature [3–6]
path protection needs a smaller cost to protect all lightpaths
Table 3 Comparison of different risk-based path protection designs for a budget of 30 units
Metric Design’s objective function
Min risk Min-max damage Min-max risk Min RMS damage
Probability of no damage 0.9782 (+8.86%) 0.8986 (0%) 0.9781 (+8.85%) 0.9633 (+7.2%)
Total network risk (Mbps) 367.36 (0%) 1,163.61 (+216,75%) 378.18 (+2.95%) 447.85 (+21.91%)
Maximum damage (Gbps) 70 (+75%) 40 (0%) 70 (+75%) 60 (+50%)
Maximum risk (Mbps) 54.17 (+12.54%) 129.89 (+169.88%) 48.13 (0%) 59.06 (+22.71%)
RMS damage (Mbps) 2,712.28 (+5.68%) 3,927.99 (+53.04%) 2,819.78 (+9.86%) 2,566.61 (0%)
Std. of damage (Mbps) 2,662.6 (+6.99%) 3,585.82 (+44.08%) 2,769.15 (+11.27%) 2,488.7 (0%)
Expected + Std. of damage 3,029.96 (+3.18%) 4,749.43 (+61.73%) 3,147.33 (+7.18%) 2,936.56 (0%)
Risk based resilient network design
Fig. 4 Probability distribution of damage with (a) no protection deployed, (b) minimum-risk design, (c) min-max damage design, (d) min-max
risk design, and (e) minimum-RMS damage design
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then link protection to protect all links. In the table, one
can see that the min-max damage has the smallest prob-
ability of no damage which is unlike the link protection
case.
In terms of the total risk, the minimum risk design has
the smallest value with the min-max risk design yielding a
relatively close value. As in the link protection case the min-
max damage design, results in the highest total risk level,
much larger than the other designs. This is because the min-
max damage design minimizes the maximum damage level,
protecting the network against failure scenarios which have
high damage levels but a small probability of occurring,
which results in a small risk reduction. Here, the min-max
damage design guards against some dual failure scenarios,
which results in the backup paths taking long routes, there-
fore requiring a higher spare capacity cost.
Next, we compare the different designs in term of the
maximum damage that could occur in the network from any
network state. The results show that the min-max damage
design provides the lowest maximum damage level; whereas
all other designs result in the comparable maximum damage
levels. For example, in Table 3, the min-max damage design
results in a maximum damage of 40 Gbps, whereas other
designs result in maximum damage levels of 60–70 Gbps.
The results are similar in the link protection case of Ta-
ble 2.
Considering the maximum risk, that could occur in any
network state, the results in Table 3 show the min-max
risk design has the lowest maximum risk. The min-max
damage design results in the highest maximum risk level,
which is significantly larger than the smallest maximum
risk level and the maximum risk levels from other de-
signs.
Comparing the designs based on the variability of dam-
age that could occur in the network. The results in Table 3
show that the minimum-RMS damage design yields the low-
est RMS value of damage, and the lowest one-side Std. of
damage. This is expected since the minimum-RMS design
seeks to reduce the variability of the damage in the design
objective. Note, that the minimum risk design yields the next
smallest variability values. Whereas, the min-max damage
design results in the highest values for both RMS of damage
and Std. of damage. In fact, all of the above results show that
the minimization of the maximum damage is a very costly
design in terms of the total risk, the maximum risk, and the
variability of damage.
Considering the designs based on the summation of the
expected damage and the standard deviation of the damage
in Table 3, one can see that the minimum-RMS design has
the lowest value just as in the link protection case. Based
on the results in Tables 2 and 3, by considering together the
expected damage and the variability of damage, network op-
erators may choose the minimum-RMS damage design and
the min-max risk design as preferred design alternatives to
the minimum-risk design approach, which is aimed at mini-
mizing the expected damage value only.
5 Conclusions
In this paper, we developed a new approach to resilient net-
work design based on managing the risk. Four risk manage-
ment based approaches for survivable network design were
proposed. Specifically, we present minimum risk, minimum-
maximum damage, minimum-maximum risk and minimum-
RMS damage survivable network design models. Numerical
results for a sample network show that all approaches can
reduce the risk from the initial value. The numerical com-
parisons show the advantage of the minimum-RMS dam-
age design over other the design alternatives in that it only
slightly increases the average network risk while greatly re-
ducing the variability in the damage.
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